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In recent years, fiscal performance in Central Europe has steadily deteriorated, in contrast to 
the improvement in the Baltics. This paper explores the determinants of such differences 
among countries on the path to EU accession. Regression estimates suggest that economic 
and institutional fundamentals do not provide a full explanation. An alternative explanation 
lies in the political economy of the accession process, and a game-theoretic model illustrates 
why a country with a stronger bargaining position might have an incentive to deviate from 
convergence to the Maastricht criteria. The model generates alternative fiscal policy 
regimes—allowing for regime shifts—depending on country characteristics and EU policies.
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I.   INTRODUCTION
  
 
In recent years, European Union (EU) accession countries (ACs) have displayed 
increasing differences in fiscal behavior. While the large Central European ACs have, for 
the most part, significantly relaxed their fiscal stance, the fiscal position of the Baltic 
economies has converged well within the Maastricht treaty’s deficit reference value. 
Although these trends have been well documented (Kopits and Székely, 2004), there is 
limited understanding of the factors that are responsible for the difference between the 
two regions. The deterioration in the underlying fiscal position is not attributable to the 
transition shock, since its repercussions  had faded by the middle of the 1990s, and were 
followed by a period of rapid growth. Moreover, the evolution of fiscal institutions—
customarily helpful in explaining differences in fiscal performance—contribute little to 
our understanding of fiscal trends in the ACs. Thus, there may be other factors 
responsible for the deteriorating fiscal stance in Central Europe, including the EU 
accession process itself. 
 
For years, one of the most powerful arguments for an early EU enlargement was that the 
accession process and the conditionality associated with it would provide an external 
anchor for macroeconomic policies—and also possibly for political developments—in 
this region. Somewhat surprisingly, the opposite seems to have happened in the large 
Central European countries regarding their fiscal policies. As we will argue below, the 
explanation for this apparent contradiction may lie in the political economy of the 
accession process. 
 
The paper explores the determinants of cross-country differences in fiscal trends. It starts 
with a broad description of these trends, identifying some of the potential explanatory 
features of the ACs. It continues with a discussion of the main factors that are generally 
thought to determine fiscal outcomes and presents a regression analysis in an attempt to 
test the significance of these factors in the ACs. The estimates suggest that the 
unfavorable fiscal performance in the large Central European economies cannot be 
explained by standard factors alone. As a possible explanation for the observed 
differences in fiscal trends, we develop a simple game-theoretic model to capture key 
aspects of the political economy of policymaking in the ACs. The model is capable of 
generating different fiscal policy regimes depending on certain characteristics of the ACs 
and on policies pursued by the EU. The paper concludes with a summary of the findings 
and of possible implications for post-accession Europe, including for the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP). 
 
II.   FISCAL PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS 
 
Following the adverse impact of the 1998 Russian crisis, the large Central European 
countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland) and the Baltic countries (Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania) followed opposite fiscal strategies (Figure 1). The Baltic countries 
quickly returned to the close-to-balanced position that characterized them prior to the 
crisis. By contrast, the Central European countries, even though they faced a significantly 
smaller shock, set out on a course of rapid fiscal loosening, reaching dangerously high 
levels of fiscal imbalance. 
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By 2002, the general government overall balance (adjusted for one-off transition related 
items) ranged from a surplus of about ¼ percent of GDP in Estonia to a deficit of 6 ½ 
percent of GDP in Hungary and Poland, with primary deficits reaching almost one half of 
this level (Table 1).
2 A marked increase in primary expenditures in Central European 
countries, particularly government wages and transfer payments, account for most of the 
prevailing differences in fiscal performance vis-à-vis the Baltics (Kopits and Székely, 
2004). 
 
These trends point to an obvious question: why have the Baltic countries been 
consistently more disciplined and why did the fiscal positions of the large Central 
European countries, which were already weak by the second half of the 1990s, deteriorate 
rapidly during 2001-03? As a first step toward answering this question, let us draw on the 
literature in search of possible explanations for differences in fiscal performance across 
countries and over time. 
 
With unchanged expenditure policy and tax structure, fiscal performance is bound to 
reflect the economic cycle. The effect of cyclical fluctuations in ACs may differ over time 
as they become integrated into the European economy to varying degrees, given 
differences in their openness to trade and their economic structure. While the large fiscal 
imbalances of the Baltic countries in 1998–99 were clearly associated with a large output 
gap—probably accentuated by a countercyclical fiscal impulse in the wake of the Russian 
crisis, the picture for Central Europe is less clear. While Hungary had no discernable 




In addition to the economic cycle, the fiscal position is likely to be influenced by the 
political cycle. The deficit tends to increase in election years and return toward its 
previous level afterwards. Thus, the rapid widening of the fiscal imbalance in 2001–02 
may have been at least partially attributable to the elections being held in several Central 
European countries. In this regard, it may be noted that there is a broadly similar type of 
governments across ACs. With few exceptions, most consist of coalition governments 
(governing with relatively small margins) that lack a clearly discernible distinction as 
regards economic ideology. The position of these coalitions tends to shift between a 
stronger or lesser attachment to the status quo in terms or privatization or government 
                                                 
2 Total expenditure and net lending and the overall deficit are modified to exclude one-off transition-related 
expenditures that are thought not to burden the budget in the future, in particular after EU accession and to 
make deficit measures comparable across countries. Similarly, privatization receipts are excluded from net 
lending and thus do not affect overall deficit. Specific country adjustments are as follow. Czech Republic: 
total expenditure and net lending and the overall balance are adjusted to exclude grants to transformation 
institutions which cover costs related to the management of bad assets. Hungary: one time, mainly capital 
expenditures made in 2002 are excluded. Lithuania: expenditure on the savings restitution program is 
excluded until 1999; no adjustment is made thereafter. Slovak Republic: expenditure on called guarantees is 
added to total expenditure. For Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia, no adjustments are made. 
3 The cyclically adjusted overall deficit relative to GDP rose by about 1 percentage point in Poland in 2001 
(Székely, 2003). 
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intervention.
4  However, differences in political arrangements can be captured by a 































Large Central European countries Baltics  
Sources: Government Financial Statistics and authors’ own calculations. 
Note: The group of large Central European accession countries includes the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland.  
 
The quality of fiscal institutions, the degree of fiscal transparency, and the degree of fiscal 
decentralization, including at the subnational level of government, are seen as factors that 
impact fiscal performance in transition economies (Gleich and von Hagen, 2003). The 
more developed the internal coordination of budget decisions (including the stringency of 
budget targets, relative roles of the executive and legislative branches, and the binding 
nature of the budget bill), the more favorable are the prospects for fiscal discipline. Also, 
contrary to the view that decentralization may foster competition among subnational 
levels of government and thus lead to greater fiscal discipline, experience in this region 
points to a common-pool problem.
6 By the same token, transparency in public finances, 
including budgetary and accounting practices, is conducive to more responsible fiscal 
behavior. Indeed, until very recently—prior to enforcement of ESA95 standards—a 
number of ACs resorted to creative accounting practices (mainly through the proliferation 
of off-budget operations and recording of privatization receipts as current revenue), 
resulting in greater latitude for loose fiscal behavior. 
                                                 
4 Not surprisingly, given the murky (if any) distinction in the type of government among these countries, 
there is no available index to gauge such differences and their potential effect on fiscal behavior.  
5 We are grateful to the authors for kindly providing the values of this variable, constructed as a Herfindhal 
index, ranging from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating smaller coalitions.. 
6 This explains, for example, the adoption of a permanent debt limit for subnational governments in Poland. 
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In general, the Baltic countries, with the exception of Lithuania, have more centralized 
public finance systems than the Central European countries (Table 1).
 7  The former are 
also significantly smaller, whereby centralization is a more feasible option, and perhaps 
even a rational choice. Yet Slovenia, similar in size to the Baltic countries and with a 
centralized system, experienced a somewhat weaker fiscal performance. Thus, while the 
degree of centralization seems to be at least broadly compatible with the observed 
differences in the level of fiscal performance, causality is hard to establish in the ACs. 
Transparency offers an even less clear-cut explanation for differing fiscal performance. 
While Estonia stands out with a high degree of transparency, and Poland and Latvia lag 
behind, the remaining countries exhibit rather similar levels of fiscal transparency and 
significant differences in fiscal performance.  
 
More important, while neither the degree of centralization nor the transparency that 
characterizes the fiscal framework of these economies changed appreciably over time 
since the mid-1990s, fiscal behavior has fluctuated significantly over this period. 
Moreover, only two ACs had adopted a rule-based policy framework.
8Hence, lacking 
evidence that the quality of fiscal institutions has deteriorated in Central Europe or has 
improved in the Baltics, this factor can hardly be responsible for the divergence in fiscal 
trends between these regions in the past few years. 
 
An additional potential explanation for differences in fiscal performance stems from the 
country’s exchange rate arrangement. This is based on the supposedly disciplining effect 
of a hard peg. A number of ACs (Czech Republic, Poland, and several Baltic countries) 
had introduced fixed exchange rate regimes early in the transition, which brought about 
rapid disinflation, and were accompanied by apparent fiscal balance. In particular, 
adherence of the Baltic countries to a currency board arrangement may be viewed as a 
determinant of fiscal discipline. However, recent theoretical work (Tornell and Velasco, 
1998; Yan Sun, 2003), building on the earlier currency crisis literature (starting with 
Krugman, 1979), indicates that a fixed exchange rate regime does not in itself ensure 
fiscal discipline; on the contrary, sustained fiscal imbalance undermines the fixed parity. 
This has been amply corroborated by currency crisis episodes, including under a hard 
peg.
9 Indeed, the chosen exchange rate arrangement is secondary to the quality of fiscal, 
monetary and financial institutions, in ensuring successful macroeconomic outcomes 
(Calvo and Mishkin, 2003). In turn, a solid institutional framework can only contribute to 
                                                 
7 The index of centralization is from Gleich and von Hagen (2003). The fiscal transparency index (the 
number of criteria a country meets out of 15 transparency criteria) is based on a survey of ROSC fiscal 
transparency modules, reported in Allan and Parry (2003, Appendix II).  
 
8 In line with the budget law of the early 1990s, Estonia adopted annual balanced-budget targets since 1998, 
which operated was along with a stabilization fund to cushion exogenous shocks. In l997, Poland enacted a 
constitutional limit on public debt at 60 percent of GDP, with cautionary limits at 50 percent introduced in 
the Public Finance Act of 1998.  For a description and analysis of the Polish constitutional debt limit, see 
Székely (2003, 2005). 
9 For a discussion of the role of fiscal misbehavior in recent currency crises, see Kopits (2004). 
Furthermore, neither the currency board arrangement in Argentina, nor dollarization in Ecuador, has 
succeeded in removing fiscal dominance in these countries. 
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discipline in macroeconomic policies, including public finances, if supported by a wide 
political consensus.  
 
III.   EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
To test for the significance of the above determinants, a regression equation is estimated 
on a pooled sample of annual observations for eight ACs over the period 1997–2002.
10 
Our model of choice is a random effects estimator, allowing for individual country and 
time effects. Limited variation over time in the institutional variables (in particular, the                         
fiscal transparency variable is completely time-invariant), makes the use of fixed effects 
estimators with individual country effects difficult. Introducing fixed time effects, on the 
other hand, takes out part of the trend in fiscal balances the study tries to identify. In 
specifications where fixed effect estimator with time effects could be used, parameters are 
very similar to those estimated by random effects estimator.  
 
 
Estimates are shown for the overall balance and the primary balance of the general 
government (adjusted for all transition-related budgetary outlays or receipts, as noted) and 
two alternative specifications (Table 2). The first specification uses real GDP growth as 
an explanatory variable, the second one the unemployment rate. Both specifications have 
their advantages and disadvantages. GDP growth might be the better indicator of 
economic activity as a whole, but (the level of nominal) GDP also appears on the left-
hand-side of the equation. This is less of an issue with the unemployment rate, which may 





10 Besides the data sources noted above, the schedule of elections for each country is available from the 











Table 1. EU Accession Countries: Selected Economic and Institutional Indicators, 2002 
 
  
Adjusted Fiscal Balance 1/ 
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Sources: IMF, Gleich and von Hagen (2003), Allan and Parry (2003), Mody and Fabrizio (2005), and authors’ estimates. 
 
 
1/ Total expenditure and net lending are modified to exclude one-off transition-related expenditures which are assumed not to burden the budget in the 
future, in particular after EU accession. For country specific adjustments see the main text. These adjustments are sizable for Hungary and the Czech 
Republic, where officially reported deficits reached 9.5 and 7.1 percent of GDP, respectively. However, for countries where pension reforms were 
implemented, the deficit reflects the ensuing deterioration of the fiscal position; in Poland, for example, this augments the deficit by 1.8 percent of GDP in 
2002.  - 8 - 
 
                                                
 
The results confirm the hypothesized influence of the economic cycle and the political cycle. 
The economic cycle is captured by the negative coefficients of the unemployment rate or 
alternatively, the positive coefficient of real GDP growth. While an economic upswing brings 
about an improvement in the fiscal balance, an election tends to lead to a temporary 
deterioration in the balance. For the political cycle, the coefficient of the election dummy is 
estimated negative in all specifications and significant at the 10 percent level in the 
specifications with the unemployment rate.
11 Although showing positive sign, in line with 
the hypothesized relationship, the indicator of fiscal centralization is not significant in any of 
the equations. The estimated coefficient for government fragmentation is not significant at 




The results, though displaying a better fit for the overall balance, are broadly similar for 
either measure of fiscal balance. The estimates also show that a change in the interest cost is 
less than fully reflected in a change in the overall balance. In other words, the change in the 
interest bill leads to a change in the primary position. As the interest bill declined in this 
period—owing to declining interest rates and public indebtedness—this result can be 
interpreted as a rather opportunistic policy approach: around one-third of the saving from 
lower interest costs was utilized to relax the primary position, while the remaining two thirds 
were translated into an improvement of the overall balance.    
 
After controlling for the aforementioned characteristics, there still remains a trend change in 
the fiscal performance of the large Central European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
and Poland) starting in 1999, the year when they joined the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). This effect was captured by a variable constructed from the 
interaction of a dummy for NATO membership and a linear time trend, that turned out to be 
significant in all the specifications.
13 The size of the trend decline implies an annual 
deterioration of the fiscal balance of about one-third of a percentage point of GDP—roughly 
equivalent to the effect of a one percentage point drop in real GDP growth. The sizable and 
significant time trend in the period following NATO accession, after allowing for all the 
factors described above, requires further investigation of the determinants of the ongoing 
fiscal expansion in the large Central European ACs. 
 
11 The election dummy is 1 in an election year and 0 otherwise. 
12 This result is consistent with the findings for segmentation reported by Mody and Fabrizio (2005). 
13 The NATO dummy is 1 in the year when a country is a NATO member and 0 otherwise. The interaction 
variable multiplies this dummy with a linear time trend. Neither the trend nor the NATO dummy was significant 










Table 2. EU Accession Countries: Estimates of Fiscal Performance, 1997–2002  1/ 
 
  Dependent Variable   2/ 
Independent Variable  Overall Balance      Primary Balance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant -3.91*  -3.312  -3.883*  -3.278 
 (2.24)  (2.846)  (2.265)  (2.861) 
        
Interest expenditure    2/  -0.66***  -0.570***  0.332*  0.427** 
 (0.165)  (0.203)  (0.165)  (0.204) 
        
Real GDP growth  0.313***    0.313***   
 (0.067)    (0.067)   
        
Unemployment rate    -0.103***    -0.103*** 
   (0.035)    (0.035) 
        
Election (dummy)  -0.490  -0.707*  -0.483  -0.702* 
 (0.354)  (0.358)  (0.350)  (0.357) 
        
NATO * trend (dummy)   -0.296***  -0.301**  -0.294***  -0.298** 
 (0.107)  (0.138)  (0.105)  (0.137) 
        
Population 0.0167  0.001  0.017*  0.016 
 (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
        
Government fragmentation  0.382  0.638  0.386  0.645 
 (0.774)  (1.573)  (0.772)  (1.572) 
        
Government centralization (index)  0.138  0.343  0.133  0.338 
 (0.327)  (0.326)  (0.329)  (0.328) 
        
R
2 adjusted (weighted)  0.46  0.34  0.39  0.12 
Number of observations  48  48  48  48 
1/ Standard errors are shown in parentheses below the corresponding regression coefficients. Significance at 10 percent level (*), 5 percent (**) and at 
1 percent level (***) as shown. 2/ In percent of GDP.
Source: Authors’ own calculations.    - 10 - 
IV.   EXTERNAL ANCHOR: FISCAL STRATEGIES IN THE EU ACCESSION  
 
The conduct of fiscal policy, as well as the development of fiscal institutions, played a key 
role in assessing the preparation of ACs for EU membership. The latter involves close 
coordination of macroeconomic policies and imposes rule-based restrictions on the fiscal 
deficit and public debt. ACs were expected to demonstrate their capacity and willingness to 
comply with these restrictions, and the annual assessment of progress in meeting the 
membership criteria placed emphasis on fiscal policies and institutions. After joining the EU, 
the new members would be subject to the excessive deficit procedure and required to present 
a medium-term convergence program, summarizing their strategy to meet the Maastricht 
criteria and to adopt the euro.  
 
Although by the second half of the 1990s virtually all ACs had declared their intention to  
join the EU there were, as discussed above, widening differences in fiscal positions. While 
the Baltic countries seem to have converged within the fiscal reference values and, as a 
result, are well positioned for an early euro adoption, Central European countries will have to 
embark on a sizable fiscal adjustment to avoid excessive deficits. The prospect of EU 
accession has clearly failed to bring about sound fiscal policies in these countries.  
 
In a stylized sense, the choice for (fiscal) policymakers in ACs has been between a loose and 
a tight fiscal stance expressed in terms of the perceived consequences of each option: on the 
one hand, the immediate political payoff from a fiscal expansion (or the political cost of 
fiscal consolidation), and on the other, the potential reward (or penalty) associated with 
convergence (or non-convergence) to the fiscal reference values. In other words, improved 
electoral prospects upfront, at the cost of the probable penalty of postponed (or shelved) EU 
accession, had to be weighed against a less favorable electoral outcome but better prospects 
of eventual EU accession. This can be boiled down to a choice between the immediate 
political gain from pursuing a dynamically inconsistent strategy and the utility gain from 
accession by adhering to the intertemporal budget constraint.
14 The actual choice was likely 
to depend on the AC’s perception of its bargaining power in the accession process, of the 
probability of sanctions for nonconvergence, of the political gain from accession (or the 
political costs of being left out), and of the policy stance of the EU.  
 
Information asymmetry may have played an important role. While in principle committed to 
early accession, neither the EU institutions nor the accession governments (with the 
exception of those with a relatively weak bargaining position) seem to have assigned priority 
to convergence to fiscal balance. The EU authorities had downplayed the importance of 
                                                 
14 This choice can be characterized as lying between two types of signaling according to the time consistency of 
the adopted policy stance, with differing effects on credibility. In the first type, initially declared excessive 
toughness, followed by laxity, lacks credibility. By contrast, in the second type, a moderately but persistently 
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compliance with the reference values;
15 instead, they sought to focus the attention of 
policymakers in ACs on the completion of unfinished transition-related structural reforms, 
which, for the most part, entail major upfront fiscal costs.
16 The objective was to avoid 
postponing these reform tasks for the sake of a seeming convergence to the reference values 
for inflation, interest rate, public debt, and deficit. Meanwhile, internally, politicians in some 
ACs found it convenient to ignore the need for convergence and—often under the cover of 
some creative accounting—to pursue fiscal expansion to enhance electoral prospects. In 
some instances, this posture was further justified by the fact that strict adherence to the 
reference values is a requirement for euro participation but not for EU membership. 
 
Therefore, during the accession process, the governments in the large ACs may have 
increasingly felt that they were in a relatively strong bargaining position regarding fiscal 
performance. Indeed, the above empirical results support the view that the large ACs, which 
also happened to participate in the first wave of NATO enlargement, experienced a continued 
worsening of the underlying fiscal position during 2001–03. This behavior can be depicted, 
in a stylized way, in a game-theoretical framework. 
 
V.   A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH 
 
With the upshot of the empirical findings being that fiscal policy behavior in the ACs is less 
likely to have been influenced by conventional economic and institutional determinants than 
the political aspects of the accession process, we turn to a simple analytical framework in the 
spirit of the more recent political-economic literature (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2000). 
In particular, we develop a game-theoretic approach capable of generating distinct fiscal 
outcomes as rational strategic choices under certain well-defined circumstances. 
 
A.   Analytical Framework 
Let us suppose that a decisionmaker faces a choice between a “loose” (L) or “tight” (T) fiscal 
policy (Fi) for country i. Further, assume that a “tight” policy would imply a fiscal deficit (or 
a surplus) in line with the conditions set for accession to the EU or the euro area, 
respectively, while a “loose” policy would constitute an excessive deficit in breach of these 
conditions. Fiscal policy is determined simultaneously in all ACs. 
 
                                                 
15 For example, in the words of Governor Balcerowicz of the National Bank of Poland, “the European 
Commission and the ECB speak too little about the need for fiscal consolidation in the context of stability and 
growth [pact] in the accession states;” see Financial Times, June 26, 2003. 
16 According to European Commission (2002, p. 149), “Central and Eastern European Countries are not 
required to fulfill the Maastricht nominal convergence criteria, but rather to comply with the Copenhagen 
criteria. The primary fiscal concern in the pre-accession period is medium-term sustainability, rather than 
achieving any particular target for the government balance. As noted above, setting of specific budgetary targets 
could be misleading and the priority should remain on improving the functioning of the budgeting process, 
carrying out structural reforms, implementing the acquis communautaire, and supporting catching up.”  
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Fiscal policy will take into account both the expected utility from the selected deficit level 
(ui) and any expected utility loss or penalty (Si) the country might suffer when running a 
loose fiscal policy. Here Si is probably best interpreted as the (exogenous) utility loss 
associated with not joining the EU or euro area. Thus, Si will be specific to each country, 




Given the political nature of the accession process, a reasonable assumption is that this utility 
loss occurs only with a country-specific probability (pi). More specifically, a decision maker 
in country i will chose fiscal policy Fi to maximize the expected utility 
 








= = L F u




if  with  i i u u >  (2) 
 
is the utility level associated with the type of fiscal policy chosen. The assumption  i i u u >  
could reflect fiscal illusion or the neglect of the medium-run consequences of fiscal 
indulgence due to political-economic reasons.
18  
 
A crucial element of the setup in (1) is the nature of pi, which is intended to capture elements 
of the political process governing EU accession. Equation (3) describes the probability of 
being left behind in the accession process as a function of three arguments: the fiscal policy 
choice made by each country; its bargaining power; and the position taken by the EU.
19  
                                                 
17 Alternatively, Si could also be interpreted as a fiscal charge, for instance the penalty foreseen in the SGP for a 
deficit exceeding 3 percent of GDP. In this case, the model would entail a sequence of two stages, with the first 
(“constitutional”) stage encompassing the determination of Si and the second stage the fiscal policy decision. 
Since the accession countries so far have no role in setting the penalties under the SGP, however, Si remains 
exogenous under the second interpretation as well. Moreover, it might still be individual to each country, as a 
given penalty set by the EU and defined in percent of GDP might cause different degrees of utility loss 
depending, for instance, on the GDP level. It is also important to emphasize that this model operates with a 
narrowly defined utility function of a policy maker and, thus, it does not incorporate the welfare implications of 
different fiscal policies.  
18 Such reasons might include the election cycle (Nordhaus, 1975), the wish to restrict the financial room of 
maneuver of a successor government (Persson and Svensson, 1989), or simply the short time-horizon of an 
outgoing government with a low re-election probability. Alternatively, one might argue that it describes the 
policy maker’s view of the benefits of a more expansionary fiscal policy in the face of an adverse demand 
shock. However, our empirical results presented above do not suggest that the significant structural 
deterioration of the fiscal balances in the large Central European ACs observed in recent years could be 
explained by alluding to (a series of) demand shocks alone. 
19 If Si were interpreted as a penalty under the SGP, pi would be the probability with which country i would 
expect to actually be forced to pay that fine in case of a “loose” fiscal policy. 
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 with  0 1 > > > > i b p p . (3) 
 
The first argument in equation (3) is country i’s policy choice. The probability of being 
excluded from the accession process (or sanctioned in another way) is 0 if a country steers a 
fiscal course in line with the conditions set for EU or euro area accession (Fi = T); it is 
positive, however, if a country opts for a “loose” or excessive fiscal position (Fi = L). In the 
latter case, the probability level is a function of fiscal stance decision makers in i expect to 
prevail simultaneously in other accession countries ( ) and country i's perceived 
bargaining position (b
i F≠
i) in the accession process vis-à-vis the EU. 
 
Another country-specific factor that plays a role in equation (3) is the political clout or 
bargaining power (bi) countries carry with respect to the EU. The role of bi in equation (3) is 
straightforward: the larger is a country’s political weight, the smaller is the probability of 
being left behind. While more than one factor influences a country’s bargaining position, a 
plausible set of determinants would include arguments such as economic size, historical ties 
to the EU, or a country’s strategic importance from a defense perspective—as discussed 
above. 
 
In addition, of course, fiscal policies are a function of the EU’s position vis-à-vis failures of 
policy conduct during the accession process. To capture the idea that the EU might vary the 
intensity with which it enforces fiscal discipline in the ACs, equation (3) incorporates 
common probability terms,  p  and  p , which capture the likelihood that the EU will pursue 
the exclusion of countries from accession in the case of fiscal behavior not in line with 
expectations of the EU. While these probabilities are the same across all countries, they are 
assumed to change with their collective behavior. The fact that the probability of being 
sanctioned for excessive fiscal deficits is declining if other accession countries chose not to 
adhere to the “tight” policy rule, too, reflects the notion that, from the EU’s perspective, it is 
easier to sanction one candidate country for fiscal misbehavior than all (i.e., when 
 and not when  T F L F i i = ∧ = ≠ L F F i i = = ≠ ). This could be because a “big bang” approach 
to EU or euro area enlargement is viewed as advantageous by EU policy makers or because 
of “economies of scale” in the political resistance put up by accession countries against 
pressures for a tighter fiscal policy.
20  
 
Obviously, since fiscal policy in accession countries is determined simultaneously, the 
political externalities build into the accession process described by equation (3) hold the 
possibility of introducing elements of a coordination problem into each country i's decision 
                                                 
20 For instance, if all countries breach the accession conditions, it would be easier to argue that a common 
exogenous shock could be behind the fiscal slippage. 
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making. That is, fiscal policy decisions could take the form of a Nash-game where 
expectations about other accession countries’ policy decisions matter rather than only 
“national” preferences or parameters. We will discuss this possibility below. 
 
B.   Policy Decisions 
To describe the fiscal decision by country i, it is useful to identify the point at which decision 
makers are indifferent between the two policy options L and T. This is the case if the 
expected utility (1) is the same under both policies, that is,  
 
4 3 42 1
i EP
i i i i S p u u
≡
⋅ − = . (4) 
 
The definition  i i i i EP S p u ≡ ⋅ −  helps to simplify notation in what follows. Using (2) and (3) 



















L F F S
b p
u u



















* . (5) 
 
The resulting decision rule is quite straightforward: for penalties above , decision makers 
in country i will find it more attractive to choose a “tight” fiscal policy; conversely, for 





i i u u >  it will be true that 
* *
i i S S > . Moreover, note that both are decreasing in  i i u u −  and bi. 
We will discuss some further characteristics of 
*
i S  and 
*
i S below. 
 
Figure 2 provides an illustration of these results. The horizontal  i u -line marks the expected 
utility level that would result from a “tight” fiscal policy, while the downward sloping EPi-
lines show the expected utility loss (or expected penalty) related to a “loose” fiscal policy. 
Note that we use  L L EP i ,  to identify the expected utility loss in the case in which all 
countries pick a “loose” fiscal policy and  T L EP i ,  to mark the expected utility loss in the 
case in which only country i picks a “loose” fiscal policy. 
 
Under a “loose” policy, the expected utility always decreases in Si, but the speed of decline is 
a function of the fiscal strategy selected in other accession countries. If all candidate 
countries pick a “loose” policy, the probability of being excluded from EU accession will be 
lower, the curve will be flatter, and the intersection with the  i u -line (which defines the 
indifference level ), will be further to the right than when only country i selects a “loose” 
policy. The reason is that, for a given level of bargaining power, b
*
i S
i, the probability of being 
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penalized in case of common misbehavior is smaller than the probability of being fined if 
only country i is running a “loose” policy, since  p <  p . Also, note that both the  T L EP i , - 
and the  L L EP i , -line become flatter as a country’s political clout or bargaining power, bi, 
increases. 
 
Figure 2. Model: The Critical Si Value 
 
T L EP i ,
L L EP i ,
i u  
i u  
*






Figure 2 helps to identify three alternative fiscal policy regimes depending on the value of Si. 
 
Regime 1: “Loose” fiscal policy always pays (
*
i i S S < ) 
For very low realizations of Si it never pays for decision makers in country i to chose a 
“tight” fiscal policy.  The reason is that, with or without other countries joining in, the 
expected utility from in acting “loose” will always exceed the utility level under a “tight” 
policy: in Figure 2, both downward-sloping lines are above the  i u -line. In game-theoretic 
terms, defaulting on the conditions set on EU or euro area accession becomes a dominant 
strategy for country i.  
 
Regime 2: “Tight” fiscal policy dominates (
*
i i S S > ) 
A related result holds at very high levels of Si. In this case, too, the decision process in 
country i becomes independent of fiscal policy elsewhere. In the example of Figure 2, both 
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downward-sloping lines are below the  i u -line. In this case, the level of Si is high enough to 
effectively prohibit fiscal misbehavior: the expected utility level under a “tight” policy will 
always exceed that under a “loose” policy, rendering the former a dominant strategy. 
 
Regime 3: Fiscal policy as a coordination game (
* *
i i i S S S < < ) 
For intermediate values of Si, however, country i's policy choice will depend on its 
assumptions regarding the simultaneous fiscal policy selection in other accession countries. 
In Figure 2, in the interval 
* *
i i i S S S < < , expected utility under a “tight” fiscal policy (the u-
line) is higher than under a “loose” policy just in country i (indicated by the  T L EP i , -line), 
but lower than in the case where all countries simultaneously run a “loose” fiscal policy (the 
L L EP i , -line). Consequently, if decision makers expect that fiscal policy elsewhere will 
stick to the accession rules, the probability of being excluded from EU for fiscal misbehavior 
is sufficiently large to make a “tight” fiscal policy the more attractive policy option. If, on the 
other hand, the other accession countries are expected to chose a “loose” policy, country i 
will play “loose” as well. In other words, the fiscal stance is determined in a coordination 
game between accession countries.
21 
 
To simplify the exposition, it is helpful to reduce Regime 3 to a symmetric two-country 
setup, with country i on the one hand and “all other” accession countries ≠i on the other. In 
this case, equation (5) describes a normal (or strategic) form coordination game that can be 
summarized in a simple matrix (Table 3), 
 
Table 3. Model: Accession as a Game 
 
    Country ≠i
Country i   L  T 
  L  a, a  d, c 




i i i S b p u a ⋅ − − ≡ ) ( > i u c ≡ > i i i S b p u d ⋅ − − ≡ ) (.  
 
While both countries are fully informed about the payout matrix, they cannot observe the 
other country’s actions before deciding on fiscal policy but move simultaneously. It is 
                                                 
21 To keep things simple, we retain the assumption that the EU is not an active player in the 
coordination phase of the game. However, while we do not model this explicitly, the EU is of 
course is crucial in defining the playing field ex ante through its influence on Si and/or p. 
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straightforward to show that the game has two Nash equilibria. If both countries expect the 
other country to choose to play L, both will choose L themselves. If, however, i and  i ≠  
believe their counterpart to select T, both will find it optimal to choose T as well.  
 
Note that the equilibrium in which both countries decide to run a “loose” fiscal policy entails 
higher pay-offs for both, making it the more attractive solution for decision maker’s in i and 
. This makes the equilibrium (L, L) more likely to be selected if the coordination game 
was played repeatedly or a refined Nash-equilibrium concept was to be applied. 
i ≠
 
C.   Implications 
Ultimately, fiscal policy decisions in this theoretical model depend on preferences expressed 
in the subjective penalty for misbehavior, Si, i.e. the utility loss from being excluded from EU 
or euro area accession. If the sanction associated with not adhering to the conditions attached 
to EU or euro area accession is very low, decision makers are likely to favor a “loose” fiscal 
policy. If, on the other hand, the penalty for fiscal misbehavior is very high, fiscal policy is 
more likely to follow a “tight” course.  
 
In addition, the expected utility associated with a “loose” or “tight” fiscal policy plays a role 
for the choice of fiscal policy. Obviously, the more developed a country’s preference for 
prudent fiscal policy or the better informed decision makers are regarding the intertemporal 
consequences of a “loose” fiscal policy, the larger is the difference  i i u u −  and the less 
attractive a “loose” fiscal policy and the “tighter” actual policy. An increase in  i u  
simultaneously moves the intersection of the  T L EP i , - and the  L L EP i , -line with the y-axis 
upward and the intersection with the x-axis to the left. This implies a decrease in both 
* S  
and
* S . A decrease in  i u  will make both lines steeper with the same effect (see equation (5)).  
 
Moreover, fiscal policy is also influenced by a country’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the EU 
authorities, which affects the probability of a country actually being excluded from EU 
accession in case of misbehavior. The stronger the bargaining position, i.e. of a larger bi, the 
more attractive it becomes to choose a “loose” policy. As equation (5) makes clear, a higher 
bi makes the  T L EP i , - and the  L L EP i , -line flatter, which will increase 
* S  and
* S . 
 
Finally, fiscal choice is a function of the EU policy position. While a limitation of the model 
is that it treats EU policies vis-à-vis the ACs as exogenous, it can still guide our discussion 
regarding possible changes in EU preferences. For instance, it can be argued that the decision 
of existing EU member countries not to strictly enforce the Stability and Growth Pact 
amongst themselves could have influenced fiscal policy choices in the accession countries. 
The relevant policy experiment within the simple model discussed above would be an update 
of the ACs’ priors concerning the (common) probability of actually being sanctioned for a 
“loose” fiscal stance in conflict with the accession process. This is captured by a decrease in 
the probabilities  p  and  p . Figure 3 describes this scenario.  
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Figure 3. Model: A Change in EU Accession Policy 
 
L F F EP i i i = = ≠
i u






For illustrative purposes, consider a country in the intermediate range (i.e., Regime 3). 
Before the EU policy change, decision makers in this country opted for a “loose” fiscal 
policy only after considering the actions of its fellow accession countries because its 
perceived losses form being left behind, (S
1). With the EU policy change lowering the 
probability of being sanctioned for misbehavior, however, it will now be beneficial to select a 
“loose” fiscal stance irrespective of other countries’ choices. Similarly, when there is a  
relatively high fear of being left behind, S
2 (Regime 2)—which before the EU policy change 
always preferred a “tight” fiscal stance—decision makers could now be tempted to select a 
“loose” fiscal stance if other accession countries did the same. In brief, intuitively, a higher 
tolerance for fiscal misbehavior is likely to lead to a looser fiscal stance in all but the most 
prudent and politically weaker ACs. 
Would this make EU policymakers reconsider? Above we suggested that a reduction in the 
probabilities of being penalized for fiscal misbehavior by the EU could reflect failure to 
implement the Stability and Growth Pact amongst present EU members. While our simple 
setup does not explicitly model the feedback on present members, it would seem unlikely 
that internalizing possible repercussions abroad could fundamentally alter their fiscal policy 
(or their selection of  p  and  p ). A present member country ignoring the  Stability and 
Growth Pact already incurs some costs, including loss of reputation and—because of 
mechanisms similar to the ones discussed above—a greater likelihood of fiscal misbehavior 
by other members countries. Internalizing the fiscal repercussions in the ACs will have an 
influence on the decisions of the “marginal offender” that is close to indifferent between 
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sticking to the rules or discarding the Stability and Growth Pact, but it is unlikely to 
fundamentally change the average fiscal stance of current EU members.
22 As a consequence, 
the ACs have little reason to readjust the priors on being penalized for fiscal misbehavior. 
 
VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
 
Stylized facts for the period 1997–2002 reveal significant differences in the fiscal balances of 
the eight leading ACs. Whereas the fiscal stance in the Baltic countries had converged within 
the Maastricht deficit reference value, fiscal performance in the large Central European 
countries was on a path of divergence. In order to shed light on the future fiscal behavior of 
ACs in the process of euro adoption, the present paper attempts to explain the differences in 
past fiscal performance.  
 
Pooled annual cross-country regression estimates of various potential determinants of fiscal 
behavior suggest that the economic and electoral cycles had a statistically significant 
influence on the fiscal trends in these countries. The fiscal balance tended to deteriorate 
during recessions and elections. The effect of fiscal institutions was marginal at best. 
Transparency seemed to be associated, though not significantly, with improved fiscal 
performance. Political structures seem to have no discernable impact on fiscal performance 
in these countries. Beyond these determinants, there is evidence that the improvement in the 
overall balance was significantly less than the saving from declining interest costs. 
 
After isolating the effect of the “usual suspects” on fiscal performance—namely, economic, 
electoral, and institutional determinants—we found that large Central European countries 
progressively relaxed their fiscal stance upon securing NATO membership in 1999. This 
statistically significant result can be interpreted as evidence of the role of political economy 
elements in the fiscal behavior of the ACs, including their perceived bargaining power in 
accession negotiations. Accordingly, a simple game-theoretic model is developed to capture 
the factors that might underlie observed differences in fiscal strategy in the ACs.  
 
The game-theoretic approach rests on a binary choice between a tight and a loose fiscal 
stance that depends on the expected utility from the selected deficit level and on the expected 
sanction—in terms of being excluded from the EU. Further, given the political economy of 
                                                 
22 If current member countries’ behavior were informed by considerations similar to the model discussed for the 
ACs, the marginal country would be likely to be of medium size, while larger countries with ample bargaining 
power would be less probable to change their fiscal decisions. Moreover, if a possible loss of reputation due to 
fiscal misbehavior translates into a loss of bargaining power along other (EU-relevant) dimensions, the 
consequences might be less dire for larger countries. It is easy to show that in a standard symmetrical Nash 
bargaining model the utility loss caused by a given absolute decrease in bargaining power is higher the weaker 
is the initial fallback position. As a consequence, when utility is concave, large countries with stronger fallback 
positions suffer less from a decrease in bargaining power than medium-sized or small countries. 
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the accession process, a key element in the utility maximization in each AC is the probability 
of being excluded from the EU, expressed as a function of the country’s fiscal policy choice, 
its bargaining power, and the position of the EU regarding the imposition of sanctions. In this 
context, each AC chooses from among three policy regimes, depending on the value of the 
sanction for loose fiscal policy: a loose fiscal stance is dominant if the probability of sanction 
is low; a tight fiscal stance is dominant if the sanction is high; and for intermediate sanction 
values, the policy depends on the choices of other ACs—that is, it is determined in a 
coordination game. The approach is sufficiently flexible to accommodate shifts in fiscal 
policy—for example, in response to changes in the EU position. 
 
According to this model, the fiscal strategy of each AC, as reflected in its fiscal performance 
in recent years, can be a rational choice. In this framework, differences in fiscal stance 
between the Baltic countries and the large Central European NATO member countries would 
be ascribed to differences in their perceived bargaining strength. In addition, the progressive 
deterioration of fiscal performance in the Central European region would be consistent with 
an apparent relaxation of the requirement of fiscal discipline, up to the second Irish 
referendum in October 2002 and the subsequent de facto admission of the ACs at the 
Copenhagen summit at the end of 2002. Arguably, the deterioration of the fiscal position in 
the large ACs can also be explained in terms of a coordinated game among these countries.  
 
With their EU membership secured, the critical issue at this stage is when and under what 
conditions the ACs will be eligible to join the euro area. As a corollary, it is of interest to 
analyze, at least theoretically, the determinants of fiscal behavior in the run-up to euro area 
participation from the standpoint of the model developed in this paper. According to the 
model, two factors will play critical role in this regard: the bargaining power of the ACs and 
the policy of the EU. The outcome will depend on the relative importance of these two 
factors.  
 
On the one hand, since the political clout of most of the ACs has been enhanced, there could 
be a more widespread tendency toward relaxation of the fiscal stance in the future. This trend 
may be further exacerbated by the budgetary implications of EU accession. Kopits and 
Székely (2004) estimate that unless ACs undertake major fiscal reforms, the direct budgetary 
effect of EU accession, on average, could widen the deficit by as much as 3 to 4¾ percent of 
GDP annually in the medium run. On the other hand, the EU may well harden its attitude 
toward ACs that fail to approach the deficit reference value—in the context of periodic 
convergence programs, subject to intensified monitoring—for purposes of joining the euro 
area, thereby offsetting in part the propensity to relax the fiscal stance. At the very least, the 
ACs will be subject to tougher transparency requirements, including full compliance with 
ESA 95 standards.   
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Somewhat less ponderable is the possible demonstration effect on AC fiscal behavior of the 
enforcement of sanctions under the SGP with respect to large EU member countries.
23 Laxity 
in this regard within the euro area could be interpreted by the ACs as tantamount to a dilution 
of sanctions—in terms of exclusion from the euro area—for failure to converge to the deficit 
reference value.  
 
Recent experience, including anecdotal evidence, suggests continuation of past fiscal trends 
in the ACs following EU entry last year, broadly consistent with the hypothesized game. The 
Baltics and Slovenia, already admitted in the ERM2 regime, stay the course of strict 
adherence to the fiscal reference value and avoid the risk of missing the 2007 target date for 
euro adoption. By contrast, the large Central European countries are being subject to the 
excessive deficit procedure—partly due to internal political difficulties in implementing 
reform steps and in reigning in the budgetary costs of accession— 
24apparently under the 
perception of a bargaining position now strengthened by the softer interpretation of the SGP 
for major EU members and thus of more liberal application of the requirements for eventual 
euro adoption.
25  
                                                 
23 Serious concern about the adverse fallout on AC fiscal policies from excess deficits in major EU members 
has been voiced unanimously by the governors of central banks of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland 
(Financial Times, August 29, 2003). 
24 As an exception, the present government in Slovakia has embarked on an ambitious fiscal reform-cum-
adjustment program with the declared goal of joining the euro area by 2009, ahead of the other Central 
European members’ objective of joining at the earliest in 2010.   
25 Interestingly, however, for the ACs (Bulgaria and Romania) slated for the next round of EU membership, a 
hardening of attitudes by current EU members, expressed in the recent rejection of the draft constitution in 
France and the Netherlands, may translate into a higher parameter p and a tighter fiscal policy stance in future 
ACs.   
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